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ECOLOGY, POVERTY AND SUSTAINABILITY:
ENVIRONMENTAL PORTENTS AND PROSPECTS IN RURAL NAMIBIA 
By Reginald Herbold Green
Blessed is the person
Who makes two blades of corn grow
Where only one grew before.
- Bible
In the dry valley....
Fragments of our lost kingdom....
Under the fading shadow 
of a dying star.
- T. S. Eliot ’The Wasteland'
Pula, Pula, Pula!
- Invocation from Botswana:
Water, Wealth, Well Being.
The Unforgiving Land
Environment, at least as a social science or a political process, is about 
human beings as well as about ecology in the more narrow sense. To modify 
Adam Smith on the incompatibility of sustained national wealth and human 
misery - no ecological zone can be healthy and sustainable the majority of 
whose residents survive in misery and extreme need.
Neither the ecological nor the human condition context nor dynamic in rural 
Namibia is an easy or a happy one. Both are unforgiving of error and past 
errors have been major and long persisted in. Basically the ecology is 
that of semi-arid to desert lands - fragile, easy to damage, hard to 
restore. The human condition is - for most rural Namibians - one of severe 
to absolute poverty in an institutional context which (even post-apartheid 
and its extended family) offers no easy ways out.
These two unforgiving realities - of ecological erosion and of human misery 
- interact. In the North more people on the same land area have pushed
2beyond the margins of ecological sustainability of soil and of vegetation. 
Need, not greed, is the destructive dynamic. In the Centre and South, 
ranches built on underpaid labour still do not earn plausible returns on 
resources used and in many cases have pushed the ecology to or beyond the 
tipping point into secular degradation. To argue about whether worker need 
or rancher greed/need is the key problem is to miss the basic reality: no 
ranching system which cannot provide decent living conditions (including 
income and access to basic services) to its working households, a positive 
return on capital used and production patterns ecologically friendly enough 
to halt/avert secular degradation can be sustainable. In this case it is 
not either/or; unless an answer can be found in terms of "and" the end 
results will be "neither/nor".
Not all choices are of that type. There are trade-offs. Namibia is water 
short - or at least most of it is inherently short of physically and 
economically accessible water. The total reasonable urban household, 
mining, industrial, rural household, livestock and crop demands is beyond 
economically viable and ecologically sustainable flow levels. Hard choices 
have to be made by use and by location. To seek to avoid them by drawing 
down stocks (as appears to be happening now in the Kaarstveldt and other 
artesian areas) is to delay facing the unforgiving limits of the ecology 
and, by so doing, to make the achievement of humanly acceptable and 
ecologically sustainable accommodations harder.
The same criticism can be made of certain schemes - partly implemented or 
sometimes proposed - for relaxing or escaping from ecological limits. One 
is medium to large scale irrigation. In a climate characterised by high 
transpiration and in arid mineralised soils it is a highroad to salination 
and land destruction especially when basic water flows are not adequate to 
allow flushing out salts annually.
Proposals for deep ploughing, levelling with heavy equipment and setting up 
standard irrigation channel systems have been made in respect of the Oshana 
country. Given the specific, complex structure of the natural ridges and 
channels this would be much more likely to reduce than enhance soil 
fertility. Worse, the deep ploughing and use of heavy equipment would 
carry a high risk (near certainty?) of cracking the relatively shallow 
hard-pan underlying the soil and surface sand thus releasing the deep salt 
water reservoir beneath it and creating a new and larger analogue to the
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ecological damage untested proposals in the context of an unforgiving 
environment and of the need for extreme caution in handling risks of 
irreversible damage could hardly be better illustrated.
Wildlife and mixed farming are competitors for (alternative users of) land, 
vegetation, water. Certainly both uses can, and should, co-exist in 
Namibia as a whole and, indeed, some areas suitable for wildlife (e.g. 
Skeleton Coast National Park, Etosha Pan) are pretty nearly totally 
unsuitable for any other use. But at the margins there are trade-offs and 
choices and the worst course is to pretend they do not exist and thus to 
make them accidentally, fragmentarily and ultimately more by inaction than 
by conscious decision.
For example, there is a sound wildlife ecology case for a corridor 
connecting the Skeleton Coast wildlife zone to the Etosha Pan one. Part of 
this corridor would require curtailing present grazing areas. Further, it 
would limit potential expansion south of grazing - or mixed farming - areas 
through boreholes to serve areas with vegetation and some rainfall but no 
surface water. This is not an easy decision because the Oshana country is 
disastrously (in terms of ecological damage and of human poverty) 
overloaded and extending it south on the east side (and on the less 
contentious west) is attractive and potentially ecologically sustainable. 
But for both Namibian and global wildlife heritage reasons (including 
potential employment and revenue gains to Namibians) restoring and 
enhancing the Northern wildlife belt from the Skeleton Coast through Etosha 
is a serious proposal deserving serious attention.
Pula, Pula, Pula!
But it is undesirable - as well as usually unnecessary - to specialise in 
the role of Cassandra. To purvey a prospect of unrelieved doom and gloom 
is to increase the probability of being doomed to that future by 
distracting attention from and demobilising efforts toward ways of averting 
disaster whether ones readers accept and despair or reject and ignore.
Namibia's ecology is damaged. It is not irrevocably destroyed. There are 
limits to ecological carrying and self-regenerating capacity, but they can
4be increased and are not yet - in most cases - hopelessly surpassed.
Judging from conversations, the press and the Independence Day Parade 
floats, ecological concern in Namibia is real and fairly widespread, an 
enabling climate necessary, even if not sufficient for ecological 
protection and regeneration. That is a climate which does not exist to the 
same degree in many other countries.
Similarly the unacceptability of the human condition of a majority of 
Namibians is not simply perceived, but is a priority in respect to 
governmental and - perhaps less uniformly - civil society action. The 
returning war migrants and the dislocated persons of town exurbs and the 
Oshakati-Ondangwa-Ongwediva triangle are visible literally and as public 
concerns. So are the conditions under which many ranch workers exist and - 
perhaps less widely - the deadly interaction of human need and ecological 
degradation in much of the North.
What is needed now is the development of a coherent, articulated, informed 
strategy in relation to sustainable environment which includes both the 
ecological and human condition strands. Because that will necessarily take 
time a set of preliminary guide-lines and caveats may be useful:
1. be cautious in the absence of clear evidence on ecological safety - 
delaying a safe gain is less damaging then incurring an irreversible 
loss;
2. where practicable halt ecological degradation now; at the least take 
action to slow it and set target dates for halting and beginning to 
reverse it;
3. give urgent attention to ecologically friendly means of increasing the 
livelihood sustaining capacity of both the small and the large scale 
farming/ranching sectors;
4. view trees-bushes-shrubs in the context of silviculture and 
farming/ranching systems (including their livelihood effects) not only 
from fuel supply, forestry and ecological preservation perspectives;
5. build up a national (and local) water flow/stock and potential 
augmentation inventory (inventories) and another of present uses as 
rapidly as possible to allow 20 year perspective programmes for water
5development, allocation, charging and use and in the interim seek, at 
the least, to halt expansion of unsustainable national (local) uses;
6. in parallel to the above proceed with water use/supply/protection 
agreements with Angola, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and - when possible 
- South Africa in respect of border rivers and trans-border 
drainage/basin systems;
7. review available experience on large, medium and small scale irrigation 
with a view to determining sustainability and viability and defer any 
borderline large and medium scale expansion until clear evidence and 
analysis is to hand while experimenting/test projecting in respect to 
small scale and, probably. Orange River margin pump or weir schemes 
(small or medium);
8. evaluate shifts in production pattern and price policies (e.g. to 
encourage mixed farming, oilseeds, urban market "truck gardening", 
silviculture) in ecological and livelihood as well as physical supply 
and food price/food security terms;
9. collect data on experience and research in other SADCC countries with a
view to adaptation and field testing crops - techniques - services - 
institutions for Namibian use (in respect to agriculture-livestock- 
silviculture generally but including ecology and food security);
10. recognise that, except for beef and karakul, rural production is not 
and will not be central to the macroeconomic dynamics of Namibia so 
that ecological viability and livelihood enhancing - not narrower 
physical or financial surplus - targets should be the central ones.
On that basis it is potentially possible to transit from "unforgiving land" 
to "Pula, Pula, Pula". If the first pula is read narrowly as rain, 
admittedly not much can be done, but if read as water then supply, 
conservation, and use are subject to major gains (or losses) from better 
and different management. Similarly wealth in the sense of riches is, in 
general, not attainable for most rural households but wealth in the broader 
sense of decent livelihoods and human conditions for those who live on the 
land is attainable as is their well-being consistent with well-being 
(sustainability) of the rural ecology.
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Looking at the ecological side it is relatively easy to draw up a general 
check-list of elements and threats but remarkably difficult to articulate - 
especially in a policy and programme focused way. The latter problem has 
at least three causes:
a) data is scarce, not readily accessible in any one or two places, full 
of gaps;
b) Namibia is not homogeneous so that to write specifically on land 
quality - use - carrying capacity - present situation future 
prospects/portents without specifying whether one is talking about the 
Kaokoveldt, the Oshana Country, the Okavango Valley, the Eastern 
Caprivi (itself arguably in three zones), the Otavi Highlands, Gibeon 
or the Orange River adjacent potentially irrigable zone makes no sense;
c. the ecological aspects cannot be abstracted from the human if one is 
concerned with future pressures and possibilities - creating an 
ecological paradise at the expense of rural residents is neither 
practicable administratively nor politically while sustaining rural 
livelihoods by ecological destruction is at best a short run expedient 
clearly fiscally (as well as ecologically) disastrous in the medium 
term.
The key ecological factors are land, water vegetation, air, sea and 
wildlife/"wilderness". The threats to them include overuse and pollution 
leading to, e.g. erosion, salination, fertility decline, quality 
degradation (in plant populations), desertification, poisoning (e.g. via 
polluted - including saline - water and airborne chemicals/radiation/dust), 
destruction of stocks (of fish or wildlife).
Of these the sea - i.e. slaughter catching of fish, shellfish and marine 
mammal stock problem - poses an important and specific problem. However, 
the ecology of Namibia makes it virtually totally separate from other rural 
ecology and livelihood issues so that it will not be treated further in 
this paper.
Air pollution's flashpoints in Namibia are Rossing and Tsumeb. Rossing is 
best seen as an environmental and occupational health time bomb which has 
been ticking away for over a decade. The air pollution downwind is very
7visible at the level of dust and - presumably - also well known in its less 
visible, but more deadly, parallel of radiation. Water pollution is also a 
known problem, which may or may not be better contained now than in the 
past. The history of the relatively comparable USA Rocky Mountain/dry 
Southwestern Plateau uranium oxide mining/processing operations suggest 
present protective and pollution reduction measures - for workers, for 
downwind/downwater communities in the Arandis-Walvis Bay-Swakopmund 
triangle and for the ecology - are seriously inadequate. Because uranium 
oxide has a relatively high value per tonne, better protection - which 
might cost $.10 to $.15 per pound - probably is consistent with continued 
profitable operation even in the present parlous state of the world 
yellowcake market. But unless a local government - trade union - medical - 
ecological pressure group is formed, inertia, private partner interests and 
fear of tampering with Namibia's second most important single economic 
asset are likely to slow or block positive change. (Realistically the 
Rossing challenge has next to nothing to do with agriculture or rural 
livelihoods.)
The Tsumeb ecological pollution focus is the smelter. (There are other 
environmental health problems in the mines but largely focused on mine 
personnel not the general public nor rural ecology.) The smelter plume 
contains a variety of noxious substances of which the chief is sulphur.
The dryness (usually) of the atmosphere limits the degree to which this 
descends as sulphuric acid but over 1,000 tonnes a year of sulphur 
particles are, in any form, ecologically unsatisfactory and humanly 
unacceptable. Technologies for sulphur (and other pollutant) extraction 
exist and are widely used. Their 'only' problem is cost - abut $.08 a 
pound gross operating and capital cost less $0.1 to $0.3 value of sulphur 
recovered for a net cost of $.05 to $.07 per pound and $0.30 a pound 
initial investment judging from Southwestern USA experience. With present 
somewhat recovered base metal prices and Tsumeb's return to profitability, 
these costs are probably just consistent with continued profitable 
operation but would very sharply reduce profits (half USA Southwestern 
smelters and associated mines closed in the 1980s - a period of somewhat 
lower prices than now - because they could not meet the costs of "clean 
air" laws and remain viable). Again the ecological problem - while 
presumptively affecting crops and herds - is not primarily rural nor 
agricultural so will not be addressed further here.
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ways because the basic issue is normally what land should be dedicated to 
which. In most cases the two uses are not mutually compatible on the same 
piece of land. For at least many wilderness and wildlife areas the answer 
is fairly easy - agricultural/ranching potential is so low that the 
ecological, human and economic balances of advantage all lie with 
wilderness/wildlife.
It is at the margin that trade-offs arise. These are unlikely to be for 
small areas: in few parts of Namibia is the use of up to 5,000 ha to 
protect a scenic attraction likely to have a high agricultural opportunity 
cost and rarely is such a small area viable by itself for wildlife. The 
Skeleton Coast/Etosha corridor illustrates the nature of the real and 
difficult choices likely to arise and is probably the most quantitatively 
significant and temporally urgent of them.
But wildlife and wilderness areas do need to be protected and serviced - 
not merely zoned - if they are to survive. To the extent costs can be 
covered from visitor fees without the visitors themselves wrecking what 
they come to preserve, no inherent problem arises (Etosha is probably an 
example). To the extent it is argued that Namibian wildlife and wilderness 
are part of a global and national heritage which has claims on resources in 
its own right there are problems of priority to that heritage and/versus 
priority to survival and development needs of poor Namibians. One possible 
way forward is to argue coherently and to mobilise external resources on 
the basis that Namibians comprise perhaps one three-thousandth of humanity 
and most are among its poorest ten per cent. Therefore the larger, richer 
units of humanity should meet the bulk of the costs for preserving 
Namibia's wilderness/wildlife as a global heritage.
Game ranching is best considered as ranching not wildlife. The ecological 
case is that many pastures have better carrying capacity for game (who also 
are less damaging to vegetation than cattle, sheep or a fortiori goats). 
While possible to overstate, this case is broadly accurate of many semi- 
desert grazing areas. The convincing logical case that such game ranching 
is/should be economically more viable remains, unfortunately, problematic 
in practice. There are viable game ranches - especially in Namibia. But 
they are few in number, usually capital and skill intensive and - unless 
adapted - apparently unsuitable for the family household ranching/mixed
9farming sector. Research and experimentation plus extension is worth doing 
but until sustainable, economically viable results are attained, enthusiasm 
for massive conversion from cattle or sheep to game should be restrained.
Human Enjoyment and Ecology
Production, distribution, power, population and poverty relations interact 
with ecology. This is particularly true of Namibia today and for at least 
two decades to come because non-rural sectors cannot supply livelihoods for 
the whole population so that "going to town" is not a solution to rural 
poverty (and would create concentrated environmental horror zones in and 
around cities and main towns broadly analogous to the present Oshakati- 
Ongwediva-Ondangwa exurban triangle situation). Indeed improving rural 
livelihood/access to services and housing conditions to avert tidal waves 
of in-comers to urban areas is a necessary strategic priority. Reconciling 
it with ecological damage reduction and reversal is not going to be easy, 
but pretending there is no such priority is likely to have even more 
negative environmental consequences.
Rural inequality characterised by cramming large numbers of households or 
fragments of households into small areas of often marginal land with next 
to no attention to raising household sector productivity is a recipe for 
growing environmental degradation (human and ecological) as population in 
these areas rises. That is the underlying historic dynamic of much of what 
South Africa described as "homelands" or "second tier authority" areas. So 
long as alternative livelihoods and houehold security systems do not exist 
for most of these people (and their descendants), the problem will remain 
and worsen even now after the ending of apartheid/'homelands'. The long 
run solutions doubtless lie in creation of alternative livelihoods and 
household security systems but the short and medium need to include changes 
to increase productivity and increase ecological friendliness.
These areas are characterised by need driven ecological degradation. Need 
for fuel for fodder, for crops to eat, for livestock to eat and to sell - 
need rising with population and, over 1967-1987 exacerbated by worsening 
urban employment and falling real remittance conditions - forces 
overcollection of bush, overcutting of trees, overgrazing, cultivating too
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continuously with too little return of nutrient to the soil. In analysing 
and acting on this type of downward spiral two dead end roads need to be 
avoided:
1. seeking to enforce ecological sustainability by fiat and force - 
unlikely to succeed and certain further to immiserize poor people;
2. saying that the ecological damage is not the poor people's fault but 
the systems's (true enough) and that therefore nothing can or needs to 
be done (false, especially as the burden of the ecological damage will 
fall primarily on the next generations of poor people).
The large ranching/mixed farming sector initially typified the economy of 
greed - stolen land, cheap (de facto forced) labour, limited ecological 
awareness), proprietor levels of consumption vastly higher than those of 
workers which were near to or below the absolute poverty line, master- 
servant type labour relations. Reconciliation should mean not shaking 
fists (or more lethal weapons) over the past but it must not mean declining 
to analyse it and its heritage.
Worker livelihoods need to be raised and households reunited - for human 
and political reasons and also to retain a labour force. Subsidies 
(already \insustainably high counting capital grants, concessional interest 
rates, residence payments, special services, etc.) need to be contained; 
overstocking and under-investment in pasture maintenance and improvement 
needs to be halted. The issue is - how? There are no longer (and 
historically have usually not been) large profit margins to meet these 
costs. Ranch proprietors, in general, do not have incomes above the 
professional-managerial-medium sized entrepreneurial average and often have 
sizeable debt burdens and low cash balances. Clearly either income (cash 
and worker self-provisioning) must be enhanced or costs cut.
Routes which would reduce employment and raise capital intensity and scale 
are open to question economically and would make a serious negative 
contribution to the adequate livelihood creation priority. Turning the 
land back to 'traditional' ranching would lower costs, but also output, 
with very doubtful gains to worker livelihood. Work team based approaches 
(or conversion to Batswana model large and medium scale ranches) could be 
viable if adequate knowledge, experience and skills were available which -
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at least for broad front conversion - they are not today. The status quo 
is not viable except in the very short run.
But some means toward an answer have to be found and acted on within 2 to 3 
years. Ostrich and game ranches may chip at the edges but the basic answer 
has to lie somewhere in the livestock - worker provisioning crop - cash 
crop matrix.
Superimposed on these two long term problems is that of the rural war 
displaced persons. While the most visible - especially from a 
capital/major city perspective - may be those returning from abroad the 
majority of displacees - especially the majority of desperately poor people 
among them - are internally displaced people from the districts loosely 
describable as the Ovambo and Kavango rural areas. These at their 1989 
peak numbered up to 300,000 whereas rural oriented external returnees 
probably are well under 50,000.
With peace and reconciliation (still evidently not fully achieved in areas 
adjacent to rebelos armados/UNITA zones of infestation) most of these 
people need to be able to return to their homes. Namibia cannot generate 
livelihoods for them anywhere else. But they cannot return without 
systematic enabling support - tools for agriculture and for house building, 
seeds, implements, household utensils, food until the harvest, core 
livestock to rebuild that aspect of mixed farming. And unless there are 
systematic family sector household friendly programmes for reversing 
tree/bush destruction and soil depletion their return cannot be made 
compatible with ecological stabilisation and sustainability.
Water: Supply Expansion, Conservation, Allocation
Water is Namibia's scarcest natural resource. It is also the one in which 
agricultural/non-agricultural trade-off issues are of immediate urgency and 
have major consequences.
There are two safe and sustainable sources of additional water - border 
rivers and the mid-Caprivi swamp. The basic problems are:
a. economic viability
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b. allocation - given that the total additional supplies are far from 
unlimited.
To the extent that allocations are to mining and to urban uses the water 
will - on site - be high cost because the concentrations of users are far 
from the borders. About that little can be done, albeit it is a case for 
shifting urbanisation (more particularly urban production and employment) 
to the North and, to the small extent likely to be practicable, the extreme 
South. But for agricultural uses the nearer the user areas to the borders 
the better. This cannot be a sole criterion - soil suitability is also 
relevant, but on the face of it capital costs and transit losses should 
create a presumption in favour of water using agricultural development in 
the North and extreme South not in the central zone.
Water management agreements are urgently needed with Angola and with 
Botswana for the Kunene, Okavango and related systems/basins. These need 
to include watershed management (including forest protection, dams, etc.), 
flow level targets, national offtake minimum guarantees/maximum allowances. 
Because at present much of the potential is not used there is a real 
possibility for amicable agreement if data collection and analysis is begun 
now and negotiations in - say - 1991.
Similar agreement in respect to the waters around the Eastern Caprivi Strip 
- with Angola, Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe - is equally desirable but 
less urgent because it is unlikely that developments in any state over the 
next decade could prejudice the rights of other users and because the 
viability of substantial irrigation in Eastern Caprivi is still less than 
clear-cut.
Orange River water right negotiations are likely to prove difficult. South 
Africa has a severe water shortage. Therefore, any South African 
government (not least a post-apartheid one) will be concerned to limit 
Namibian offtake. That offtake is now very small because the former 
occupying power blocked almost all recent applications for pump or other 
schemes on the North Bank while developing an irrigation zone at Uppington 
to the South.
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The immediate priorities would appear to be:
a. securing preliminary assessment of technical and economic feasibility 
of pump scheme, weir and/or larger irrigation schemes drawing water 
from the Orange and of plausible requirements;
b. estimating total Orange River flow (pre diversions in Lesotho from the 
Orange to the Rand) and determining what per cent Namibia as one of the 
three Riparian states can plausibly demand - say 10% or 5%? (On the 
basis of share of the three states' population it would be about 5% but 
Namibia - especially Southern Namibia - arguably has less alternative 
sources than South Africa.)
c. publicly and formally asserting Namibia's rights as an Orange River 
Riparian state. (This means rejection of RSA's claim to a North Bank 
boundary. That claim rests on the fact that German colonial land 
claims were precisely that - they did not state water boundaries. In 
practice in the Cameroon and Tanganyika cases the Germans and British 
colonial authorities used the "thalweg" or middle channel of the river 
or lake as the water boundary.)
d. issuing some Orange River water abstraction licenses soon and beginning 
operation of at least a few new pump schemes plus, perhaps, expansion 
of the Oranjemund one. (South Africa is unlikely to choose to make a 
casus belli of such action.)
e. request both Lesotho and South Africa to negotiate a permanent - or at 
least an interim agreement. (And secure expert negotiating advice. 
Swaziland's experience may be instructive in certain positive and 
negative aspects, albeit in that case South Africa accepted from the 
start that Swaziland had some downstream rights and there was already 
substantial historic offtake.)
While draining the Middle Caprivi swamp (and perhaps irrigating into East 
Caprivi with the offtake?) would appear to be sustainable and not evidently 
ecological vandalism (unless a special case for that particular swamp's 
ecological uniqueness and importance can be made out), no action appears 
urgent. It is totally unclear what optimum uses for the land would be; 
whether and when it would be viable; what the capital cost would be and how 
it could be mobilised. At most beginning an ecological and a pre-
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feasibility drainage and land/water use study in 1992 would appear 
appropriate.
Whether damming or otherwise collecting runoff water is a safe additional 
source is a contextual and empirical question. To the extent it would 
otherwise flow - e.g. - directly into areas of the Namib and Kalahari with 
no vegetation or animal population probably yes. But if it either provides 
seasonal water to vegetation/animals or recharges underground water tables 
there is a clear trade-off. Since physical water storage and movement 
costs (notably evaporation) are high, it is not self-evident that there is 
a case for systematic damming of every seasonal watercourse though there is 
for some.
The most vexed problem relates to borehole, well and pumped spring water.
In these cases pumping can for a time exceed recharging but at the price of 
lowering the water table. Determining when the sustainable offtake level 
has been passed is not easy - except in gross overdrawing cases - because 
of national, regional and local drought cycles. The logical policy is one 
of prudence:
a. if it is likely but not absolutely certain that offtake secularly
exceeds recharging then no new or expanded offtake should be allowed
(except for local human consumption) until a definitive
flow/stock/offtake/recharge analysis is completed. This appears to 
apply to most of the Kaarstveldt and some lesser artesian areas today. 
It is better to underuse for a few years than to face a future problem 
of cutting use below recharge to restore water tables. And any 
additional investment made prior to discovering the need to freeze or 
cut offtake will be wasted;
b. where offtake clearly is grossly above recharge now, move at once to 
phase down offtake - phased parallel to bringing in "outside" water 
where this is economically feasible;
c. if present offtake clearly is sustainable, but the maximum sustainable
level is in doubt, allow limited additional offtake while giving 
priority to a definitive study of sustainable offtake. This may be 
relevant to certain areas south of the Oshana country and 
east/southwest of the Oshana pan. In those cases preference should be 
given to family sector household use (including livestock).
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Desalination is - barring major technological breakthroughs - not relevant 
to agricultural (or scattered rural village/homestead) use for cost 
reasons. It may be relevant for selected towns, industries or tourist 
sites on the coast.
Irrigation is not a substitute for water. That may seem obvious, but there 
have been irrigation programmes which built, up reservoir and user capacity 
far above poor rainfall flow levels and thus made irrigated agriculture 
almost as rain dependent as rainfed, especially if below average rainfall 
periods exceeded on year. Examples exist in Zimbabwe.
Large scale irrigation in Namibia is unlikely to be viable except from 
border rivers or the Middle Caprivi Swamp. (The Oshana Country could be 
described as large scale natural irrigation which might be augmented by 
diversion of Kunene water into the system, but this is in effect a border 
river case.) Even then viability is in doubt despite recent sugar estate 
proposals. Before risking its own resources (including guarantees and 
subsidies) Namibia should secure far more viability (and even feasibility) 
analysis.
Medium scale irrigation from pump schemes drawing on border rivers (and the 
Okavango) clearly can be viable albeit where, for what crops, under what 
techniques, requires further study. For the family sector there may be a 
case for co-op or public sector pumping units and main channels selling 
water to household units. Whether medium scale irrigation on the 
Hardap/Mariental model is economically viable or - given salination 
problems - even sustainable ecologically requires further study of existing 
projects before new ones are initiated.
Boreholes are unlikely in most areas (the Kaarstveldt including Otavi 
Highlands/Tsumeb and some other artesian zones may be exceptions) to be an 
economically viable source for irrigation of substantial areas. The 
exceptions are likely to be in cases in which rain and natural surface 
water provide most of crop needs and only relatively short seasonal or 
drought year topping up from pumped or artesian underground sources is 
needed.
Spot irrigation in basically ranching units (e.g. "kitchen gardens", fruit, 
vegetables, limited grain) for household self-provisioning may be viable.
In this case the water for crops is a joint product or by-product with that
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for human and livestock use and - subject to offtake limits - may have a 
low incremental cost. There is an urgency in ascertaining what the 
empirical realities in different districts are as such additional food 
output is one possible route to raising total ranch cash sale and worker 
consumption output value, such increases could help bridge the conundrum of 
unacceptably low wages, unacceptably high subsidies and - for most ranches 
- marginal present unit profitability.
Water pricing (and user facility offtake limitation) poses a series of 
difficult questions for Namibia. A - controversial - set of principles (or 
rules of thumb) might include:
a. full cost (including depreciation and interest on capital cost) pricing 
to mining, manufacturing and commerce. This is crucial to avoid 
distortions of uses and of location in the context of physically 
scarce, high cost water. If specific mines or industries or towns can 
make a case for subsidies, this should be specific to the unit and 
transparent, not general and hidden in the water price/budget;
b. cross subsidisation of urban household water prices via an inverse step 
tariff (i.e. higher charges above some threshold level because car 
washing and urban gardening are consumer amenity goods, unlike basic 
drinking/cooking/cleansing water) with some charges (perhaps on a 
neighbourhood user committee basis) even for stand-pipe water;
c. partial subsidisation of rural household water and of small ranch/mixed 
farm livestock water. Overall the goal should be to recover at least 
recurrent/maintenance costs but this needs to vary from district (or 
sub-district) to district in relation to total water cost and lowness 
of income. Again innovative use of water user committees to collect 
funds and to provide labour/routine maintenance should complement or 
substitute for more usual fee systems;
d. full cost pricing for commercial ranches/farms served by publicly 
financed water supples, e.g. FNDC or other large ranches and 
Mariental/Hardap irrigation plots. When (a) this charge would force 
closure of the unit and (b) there is a clearly defensible social or 
broader national economic case for keeping the unit in being, a flat 
sum subsidy flat not per unit of water used to encourage water 
conservation should be paid. For example, Mariental/Hardap could not
bear full cost pricing; it arguably has experimental/demonstration 
value; it is not clear there are alternative uses for the water. 
Therefore, pending review, lump sum subsidies paid from the Treasury to 
the scheme may well be justified at the same time as full cost water 
rates;
e. strict licensing (including some form of monitorable offtake ceiling) 
on ranch-farm-other enterprise extraction of water from own facilities 
unless there is no present or near term limit to withdrawals from that 
source. A "grandfather clause" approval of recent past offtake levels 
may be necessary as a starting point (subject to later review) but new 
or increased offtake proposals should be strictly monitored especially 
in borehole areas with secularly falling water tables where - in 
general - the applications should be disapproved.
Clearly price is not an adequate sole policy instrument. But for 
commercial enterprises and for urban areas as a whole it is hard to justify 
subsidising a scarce resource with an incremental capital and operating 
cost above average cost (and present charges). Subsidisation should be 
targeted to poor urban households and to household sector rural families in 
water charges and to enterprises (rural, mining or urban) which can make a 
case via transparent general subsidies (not water rate concessions). 
Furthermore, while enterprises should be encouraged to produce their own 
water (which full cost pricing for public water sales will do), their 
offtake must be controlled because sources are limited and in the absence 
of control a combination of "first drilled, first served", more and more 
wells producing less and less per well and rapidly falling water tables is 
highly likely.
Vegetation: Trees, Bushes, Pasture
Namibia faces three major and two secondary environmental degradation 
dynamics in respect to vegetation:
1. degradation of pasturage from the interaction of overstocking and 
drought cycles;
2. denudation of shrub, bush, tree cover especially in the densely 
populated northern areas as a result of household fuel and pole
requirements and - secondarily - levels of stocking and intensity of 
cultivation;
3. rapid reduction of tree and large bush cover to supply urban household 
fuel requirements;
4. commercial and artisanal forestry cutting without replanting;
5. human and livestock presence in/entry onto exceedingly fragile 
ecological environments.
The dominant dynamics driving this pattern of ecological and human 
condition degradation are human population, animal stock levels, drought 
and - in the past decade - war. The ecology/poverty interaction and the 
dominance of need or mixed need/greed factors are evident. Only in the 
case of some of the forestry (including the war looting of trees and 
trophies) and the richer ranches (which on the whole have better pasture 
conservation and safer stocking levels - not worse) can pure greed be put 
forward seriously as being dominant.
To approach the challenge as primarily one of forestry or of trees as 
normally defined is misleading. Pasturage is at least as important as 
trees-bushes-shrubs and these are by no means limited to trees. Fuel, 
artisanal and household building and fodder are the main users (or 
denuders) of trees-bushes-shrubs, not commercial forestry. Pasture for 
stock, fuel and poles for rural households, and fuel for low income urban 
households are important to at least 1 million poor Namibians whereas 
forestry will never be a major sector in economic terms nor in livelihood 
generation.
Pasture degradation flows from overstocking absolutely or relative to 
carrying capacity during drought cycles. It is reportedly prevalent in 
marginal large ranching zones, the densely populated northern areas, barren 
southern ex-'homelands1 and (perhaps less uniformly) the ex-Omaheke desert 
areas developed for grazing by the post-War of Resistance Herero refugees.
A detailed review and survey (perhaps from analysis of satellite picture 
blowups is needed to pin-point extent and location). In a different sense 
war clearances and abandonments may have resulted in bush and coarser grass 
growth which also damages pasture cover.
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The Interaction with drought occurs when stock sales (or deaths) early in 
the drought cycle do not keep pace with decline in sustainable carrying 
capacity and restocking after the drought proceeds too fast and with too 
little investment in pasture regeneration to allow recovery. It is 
possible that the poor price/cost position and the security/political 
uncertainties following the last drought cycle have delayed restocking to a 
degree helping natural regeneration. On the other hand they have surely 
also cut investment in regeneration.
In respect to large ranches the programme outline for restoring and 
maintaining pasture is fairly clear:
)
a. produce (or check existing) data on carrying capacity in normal years 
and requisite cutbacks during droughts;
b. monitor actual herd levels and provide financial penalties for 
sustained, significant overstocking;
c. review data (including Botswana, Zimbabwe data) on methods of pasture 
regeneration and upgrading with full field testing (at government cost) 
on selected ranches;
d. provide partial grants and/or full soft loans for regeneration on 
degrazed or at risk units;
e. carry out an exercise similar to "c" in respect to stock level, 
"paddock" rotation (with and without wire fences - without is more 
labour intensive but may or may not be more costly if fences are not 
subsidised by capital and/or interest grants) including recent 
innovations in Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia;
f. provide effective extension based on "e" (including any new methods 
found desirable - present ones are presumably extended by existing 
service) and impose financial penalties for serious mismanagement.
Such an approach should halt degradation and begin regeneration within two 
years. It would provide a breathing space for data collection and analysis 
toward a longer term solution.
For 'traditional' ranching and mixed farming areas a somewhat different 
approach is needed:
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a. broaden carrying capacity and rotation of pasture studies and extension 
services from the large ranch sub-sector to include all livestock 
growers (the Zimbabwe and Botswana approach);
b. encourage lowering stock levels where excessive, as well as investment 
in pasture improvement and rotation systems by extension and partial 
grants/soft loans, plus providing a last resort/fair price market for 
culled stock until/unless there is a competitive, accessible commercial 
stock buying network to do so;
c. explore the possibility of local government (at village or herding 
community level) imposition of sanctions against those keeping too many 
stock and/or practising bad pasture maintenance/rotation techniques. 
Central government penalisation is unlikely to be very effective and is 
certain to be deeply resented judging by experience elsewhere in 
Africa. (A functioning system exists in several Northern States in 
Nigeria - at quasi-traditional local government level).
A necessary complement to the basic small scale/mixed ranching pasture 
regeneration and reduction of stocks in overused areas is extending usable 
grazing areas. This can be done in some cases by selective use of 
boreholes in adjacent areas with some vegetation/rainfall but no surface 
water. However, care must be taken to avoid the disaster created by the 
Club de Sahel in its comparable programme in West Africa which ended by 
raising, not spreading, herds and shifting them during good years to areas 
whose vegetation cover was then overgrazed and collapsed totally in the 
early 1980s drought cycle. New areas should have firm stock ceilings from 
the start.
In certain 'traditional' ranching areas serious equity problems arise. 
(Examples include the ex-Omaheke and Rehoboth). Very unequal access to 
grazing rights and herd sizes combine with limited sustainable carrying 
capacity to prevent escape from absolute poverty for the lo or nil herd 
majority of households and/or to ensure overstocking and degradation. 
Clearly the issue is potentially explosive but the only environmentally (or 
ecologically) valid answers are absolute ceilings on herd size or absolute 
reduction in numbers of households.
Household fuel and building pole damage to tree-bush-shrub stocks have 
causes similar to pasture degradation in the small ranching/mixed farming
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sector. This is hardly surprising as the same households facing the same 
poverty pressures are acting on the basis of short term survival necessity 
in both instances.
The degree of present damage varies widely. It is appalling in - e.g. the 
central Oshana country and certain southern rural slums, e.g. Bethanie, 
used by the past regime as human dumping grounds. It is moderate in some 
less arid and less populated areas - e.g. parts of Eastern Caprivi.
However, with rising population on the land (plus growing urban fuel 
demand) and repetitive drought cycles, the danger of further degradation is 
national not local.
No response based primarily on coercion - forbidding cutting of vegetation 
or forced relocation of families - can be humanly acceptable nor can it be 
politically sustainable nor administratively practicable. Equally, rushing 
about planting (paying people to plant) trees without prior study of local 
contexts and building up community support is unlikely to do much good.
An initial programme (or set of district/zonal programmes) might include:
a. survey of present position (possibly from analysis of blown up earth 
satellite photographs) and - to the extent possible - trends;
b. development of extension programmes (backed by appropriate traditional 
of field tested seeds/seedlings) to encourage household and village 
woodlots, windbreaks, farmstead groves;
c. operating "b" on a modern silvicultural focus taking into account human 
food, fodder, poles (for building), thatch and fuel uses of individual 
and combined trees-bushes-shrubs. (Such multiple uses do characterise 
past Namibian household economies/livelihood especially, but not only, 
in areas near Kunene and Okavango rivers);
d. utilising tree planting (especially for urban fuel supply but also for 
soil conservation, watershed protection, village fuel/building 
materials) as a seasonal, labour intensive supplementary employment 
programme (e.g. up to 2 months per person employed at R 3 to 4 per day 
with 50% or more of person months to be female) to serve both 
ecological regeneration and poor household human environmental 
rehabilitation objectives;
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e. encouraging local government/communities to engage in 'community 
forest1 and 'pasture shrub-bush-tree population' management and 
protection and to exert social pressure sanctions on reckless 
destruction of vegetation;
f. studying experience on poor household silviculture and community 
forestry in, e.g. India, Ethiopia and Tanzania with a view to 
adaptation and testing in Namibia.
These steps are probably at best a temporary damage halting/partial 
reversal stopgap at least in the central Oshana country. There the 
population/land ratio (taking fertility into account) is probably well 
above long term environmental sustainability. But they should buy time to
be spent on longer term transformations, including achieving other rural or
urban livelihoods for some of the families now resident in overcrowded 
Northern (and Central/Southern rural slum) areas.
Urban fuel requirements cannot in the long term be met fully from
sustainable wood production. To date they seem to have been met primarily 
by a cancerous destruction of wood stocks in growing circles around cities 
with resultant increases in poor household real fuel costs and longer and 
longer hauls for wood which tend to concentrate gains in buyer-transporter- 
wholesaler oligopolies.
To date there are no cases in SSA of achieving sustainable or even stable 
real cost low income urban household fuel supplies. Greater efficiency in 
wood use has limitations as does enhanced rotational (self-sustaining) 
production while alternative fuels either have high initial capital costs 
(e.g. electricity, bottled gas) or fuel bills (e.g. kerosine) or both (e.g. 
coal) and some - especially coal - pose ecological questions and others 
safety ones (e.g. kerosine and, to a lesser extent, bottled gas). An 
initial Namibian programme package could have two clusters - demand 
containment and sustainable supply expansion:
Demand containment (especially Windhoek)
a. encouragement of use of electricity for cooking/lighting by low
connection charges and low rates for small consumers (cross-subsidised 
by higher unit charges to large consumption households) as well as by 
market access to low cost small 2 or 3 'burner' hotplate type cookers;
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b- analogous promotion of bottled gas;
c. analysis leading - if results are positive - to promotion of sawdust,
coal and mixed heating briquets (and low cost artisanal stoves for 
them) to supplement/substitute for wood;
d. study of whether a low cost (i.e. recovery of initial capital cost in
fuel saving in 6 months or less), improved efficiency, artisanally
producible stove is feasible and if so its promotion (including initial 
support to workshops producing it) for a limited period.
Sustainable Supply Enhancement
a. identify suitable (ecologically, economically) trees for rotational 
woodlot/plantation production by district/zone;
b. provide extension advice to potential growers (rural family sector 
households, ranches, co-ops, mining companies) and back this up with 
partial establishment period capital grants and/or soft loans (possibly 
channelled via a seasonal employment programme of the type discussed in 
respect to household/village sector tree stock regeneration);
c. limit public sector 'production' to tree planting for ecological and 
watershed/reservoir protection and - if seen as necessary - a limited 
number of small, 'demonstration' mini-plantations;
d. monitor whether moderate cost, competitive purchasing, transporting, 
wholesaling channels do emerge as a result of market forces and - if 
not - provide technical assistance and soft loans/loan guarantees to 
co-op or small business purchasers-hauliers-urban marketers.
Commercial forestry - concentrated around Rundu except for a few 
(presumably 'self-sustaining') pit prop plantations associated with mines - 
is almost certainly cutting at unsustainable levels and failing to exercise 
proper forest management techniques. It is, however, a lesser and more 
limited area ecological destroyer than the previous three simply because 
Namibia has never had (and barring rather unlikely climatic or water 
availability changes, never will have) large forest areas. To the extent 
it is dominated by medium sized sawmills or full time established artisanal 
pit sawyers, standard control and extension measures should be applicable. 
So far as human environment/poverty issues are relevant they probably turn
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more on the sustained supply of reasonable cost inputs into construction, 
carpentry, furniture production than on livelihoods in forestry itself.
However, as there is a forestry department and a number of para- 
professional foresters trained abroad, an initial programme should be set 
up speedily including:
a. setting logging limits and logging charges;
b. encouraging replanting via multi-year concessions renewable if well 
managed/revocable if overlogged and partial rebates of logging charges 
toward agreed replanting programmes (not directly applicable to pit 
sawyers);
c. conducting a detailed forest inventory (again probably starting with
analysis of satellite photo blowups) and collection of modern forest
management/regulation techniques (including via the relevant SADCC unit 
in Lilongwe);
d. on the basis of "c" revising the initial measures taken at "a", "b"; 
probably instituting seedling production and distribution; possibly 
creating forest reserves with no or highly selective logging allowed.
Rather more detailed and technical discussion of fuel and forestry issues 
is to be found in the relevant chapter of Namibia: Perspectives Towards 
National Reconstruction and Development.
The fragile ecological zone intrusion problem is basically a 
wildlife/wilderness one as the relevant areas - e.g. parts of Fish River 
Canyon and coastal belt - are hardly of much value for livestock let alone 
crop or tree production. The danger presumably comes primarily from 
tourists. The cure probably lies - at least in the short run - in ensuring 
that all such areas are gazetted as national parks and/or reserves with 
access by all persons (except present residents, e.g. San) allowed only by 
permit; that permits are limited in number and carry high enough fees to 
provide for accompanying (necessarily small) parties with a guide. Recent 
past damage has - reportedly - been severe but apparently related to 'spare 
time1 activities of the former occupying power's 'security' forces so the 
immediate risk of further damage may not be massive.
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The Land - Overuse and Undernourishment
Namibia's land suffers from wind and water erosion. This is - with the 
exception of coastal dune movements - apparently moderately limited in area 
and/or scope and - except to the extent it relates to water or pasturage or 
tree-shrub-bush ecological damage - not readily controllable in the short 
run. For example, no general ecological protection programme could have 
saved the Finger of God - even setting aside the views of those who saw its 
fall as a symbol of the withdrawal of the "Mandate of Heaven" from the 
former regime. Grouting with special concrete and coating with a resin 
skin might have, but at a cost limiting the conceivable frequency and 
extent of application.
The land degradation dynamic interacts closely with those of water and 
vegetation. Therefore in one sense the water and vegetation analysis and 
programme explorations above are as important to land protection as what 
follows.
Land quality reduction - especially in the densely populated areas in the 
North - results from too frequent cropping draining nutrients from the soil 
with limited or no replenishment. Degradation of vegetation exacerbates 
this process by furthering limiting nutrient return as does burning (rather 
than digging in) of crop plants after harvest. Livestock usually take less 
nutrients (via grasses) from the soil and return more via manure - unless 
it is collected and used for fuel as may happen with tree-shrub-bush 
degradation.
This is at present a poverty cycle with growing numbers of people wedged 
onto a fixed (and relatively low natural productivity) land area. Its 
extent will expand if cropping is broadened and intensified, e.g. in 
Caprivi, Okavango Valley and Otavi Highlands albeit in those cases the 
longer term poverty consequences will, initially, be less visible.
The answer does not lie in "traditional African practices". This is not 
because the rural African family sector does not have a working grasp of 
sustainability or a respect for the land. Neither is it because the 
techniques were unsound "before the Europeans came". Rather it is for the 
reason that they turned on relatively long rotations with a low ratio of 
cropped to resting years. That approach requires a low household/land 
ratio which is no longer possible in much of the North.
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Economically viable, soil sustaining, intensive cropping (low rest to crop 
year ratios and high crop output per hectare) requires direct return of 
nutrients to the soil. Digging back unused portions of crop, increasing 
tree-bush-shrub population, use of livestock manure can contribute 
something but often not enough. Selective use of chemical fertilisers is 
necessary. (Organic gardening in the north is on balance hi tech, lo yield 
per hectare and hi cost per kilo produced. These are not the ideal 
characteristics for either household self-provisioning or urban food supply 
crop production in Namibia.)
It is difficult to devise programmatic steps at present for two reasons: 
first, black small farm households are largely outside the experience and 
coverage of the extension service and second, even in respect to large, 
white farmers the extension service's priorities and competences have 
focused on livestock. That said, certain elements toward a programme can 
be identified:
1. broadening the extension service to encompass all farmers and adapting 
its techniques to ensure that it is user friendly for small farmers:
2. strengthening the crop oriented component of the service and its back­
up research (including collection and adaptation/testing of research 
and extension results elsewhere in the Region, e.g. via SACCAR in 
Gaborone);
3. analysing possible (ecologically and economically) crop rotations 
including crops (e.g. some oilseeds, legumes, fodder plants) providing 
natural restoration of soil nutrient levels as well as potential gains 
from better use of manure and crop by-products (e.g dead plants). 
Extending positive results achieved from the analysis and testing;
4. securing relevant data from comparable ecological zones, backed by 
local testing, on response to chemical fertilisers in different 
Namibian ecological zones and channelling results into extension 
advice;
5. providing initial use incentives for selected fertilisers through 
limited period free "starter packs" either as a self-standing project 
or (as in Zimbabwe) in conjunction with introducing/encouraging new 
crops.
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A special problem does arise in respect to soil nourishment and to human 
animal disease control. The techniques needed for these purposes are not 
usually ecologically neutral.
Likely levels of fertiliser and pesticide/herbicide application do not seem 
very likely to have serious water pollution risks. However, this may not 
be so valid an assumption if well sources are close to the surface and draw 
from mini-aquifers nor in respect to low flow seasonal streams and to water 
passing through irrigation schemes such as Mariental/Hardap.
The danger to users is significantly greater. For fertilizers and some 
pesticides/herbicides clear labelling and extension demonstrations are 
needed and can be adequate. For other pesticides/herbicides either 
controlled use by trained personnel or bans are the realistic options and 
for the most dangerous pure bans. As an initial guide to which is which 
and what to do about it, data should be secured on USA and on Zimbabwean 
experience and regulations.
Animal disease control (particularly in respect to tse tse flies) and human 
disease control (particularly in respect to anopheles mosquitos) are 
occasionally challenged by ecologists on behalf of the flies and mosquitos. 
The present author admits to a bias in favour of young children (the main 
victims of malaria) and small ranchers/mixed farmers (whose livelihoods are 
most at risk from tse tse flies) and therefore rejects these arguments out 
of hand. Similarly, the bush clearing often needed for permanent tse tse 
control is normally not inconsistent with ecologically acceptable ground 
cover and the protection of a thicket for ecological reasons when it is an 
actual livestock and potential human sleeping sickness focus is presumably 
not appealing to any but the most single minded of ecologists.
However, the chemical problems are very real. The ones which are effective 
and affordable range from pretty noxious to potentially catastrophically 
so. The potential victims are the people and livestock to be protected 
plus wildlife so that this problem cannot be brushed aside. The best that 
can be done is to use the lowest possible dose of the least noxious 
effective and affordable chemical under the greatest practicable safeguard. 
In respect to the tse tse fly there is a body of Southern African 
experience albeit the evaluation of the use - under tight control - of 
dieldrin is incandescent from two directions with ecologist objections to
28
its use at all and aid agency/livestock scientist/sprayer near explosions 
over how restrictive safeguards have been.
"Pula, Pula. Pula!" ?
The previous sections do not constitute a complete ecological and human 
environmental programme for rural Namibia. Their aim is much more modest:
1. to demonstrate the negative and systematic interactions of ecological 
degradation and human poverty in Namibia;
2. to identify the most serious environmental/ecological risks and
downward dynamics in rural Namibia today with special reference to
agriculture;
3. to suggest how one can ask questions about these risks/downward 
dynamics which direct attention toward humanly and ecologically 
sustainable answers - and to ask some of those questions;
4. to suggest some initial, partial answers which - if implemented - could
improve present environmental/ecological dynamics and buy time for 
articulating longer term strategies based on additional data and 
analysis.
Clearly that is not enough to announce the attainment of "water, wealth, 
wellbeing!" but it should be a first step in that direction. Ecological 
sustainability - especially in a context of pervasive rural poverty and a 
fragile natural environment - is only attainable at the end of a long 
journey. To begin that journey requires taking first steps now (precisely 
because the journey is long and the time not so long) and taking them in 
the right direction (because wrong steps may be virtually unrecoverable).
It is as a pointer to some of these steps that the present paper is 
presented.
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